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LORIN DRAPER, ROBERT B. 
CLEMENTS and JOE GREINER, 
Defendants, 
Respondents. 
CASE NUMBER 17263 
-------------------------------------------,------------------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant sued respondents for injuries suffered 
on June 9, 1979, in Ogden City, when respondents attacked and 
severely beat appellant. Appellant sued respondents as private 
individuals and not in their capacity as police officers. 
Respondents made a Motion to Dismiss based on the ground that 
before filing an action against police officers a bond must be 
filed in accordance with Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 (1977). 
Appellants contend that since respondents were being sued as 
private individuals, a bond need not be filed. Furthermore, 
by imposing a bond under these circumstances, a poor person, 
such as the appellant who had filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity, 
would be denied access to the Courts. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents v;,15 
granted by Third District Judge, Ronald 0. Hyde, on July 21, 
1980. The Court held that the action "[arose] out of, or in 
the course of, the performance of the defendants' duties as 
police officers, and a bond must be filed before filing act~n 
against said defendants". 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Lower Court's Order of Dismissal should~ 
reversed because: 
a. A bond need not be filed in this action, 
since it is brought against the respondents as private individuoj 
who were acting far beyond the normal range of legitimate police[ 
I 
conduct; and i 
b. Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, I 
providing for the imposition of a bond prior to filing an 
against police officers, is unconstitutional on its face and I 
as applied because it denies access to the courts to those unabl'., 
to afford the cost of posting a bond. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I 
of "lexicdn-Ame•l 
th rough penoc:j 
Appellant is an unskilled laborer 
descent who manages to support his family of six 
work as a security guard. Because appellant's income is belm1 
the officially established poverty level he filed an 7\ffidavit 
of Impecuniosity at the time of filinq his action. 
2 
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On June 9, 1979, in Oqde>n City at the corner 
of Washinyton and 31st Street, appellant joined his children 
and brother-in-law to talk and socialize. Defendants approached 
the group and proceede>d to remove them from the corner by using 
loud, insulting abusive and threatening language. Appellant 
then entered his home, located approximately one-hundred 
feet from the corner, and contacted defendants' supervisor 
to complain about the abusive action undertaken by the 
defendants. Upon coming out of his home defendants attacked 
the appellant without any cause or provocation. Defendants 
hit, kicked and choke>d the appellant. That as a result of 
the attack appellant suffered abrasions, cuts, contusions 
on his body and head; and, muscle spasms around the neck. 
Appellant also incurred $193.63 in medical expenses. 
Appellant's attorney studiously drafted his 
complaint so as to state a cause of action against the defendants 
in their individual capacity. At no time has appellant 
tried to attach the defendants' bond; and, appellant has 
refrained from sueing the City of Ogden or including the 
City of Ogden as a defendant in this suit. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRJ\NTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY 
FRAMED AS BEING AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
INDIVIDUALLY AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT SHOW 
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANTS ACTS WERE WITHIN THE PER-
FORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 provides: 
Before any action may be filed against 
any sheriff, constable, peace officer, 
state road officer, or any other person 
charged with the duty of enfo~cement of 
the criminal laws of this state, or 
service of civil process, when such 
action arises out of, or in the course 
of the performance of his duty, or in 
any action upon the bond of any such 
officer, the proposed plaintiff, as a 
condition precedent thereto, shall 
prepare and file with, and at the time 
of filing the complaint in any such 
action, a written undertaking with at 
least two sufficient sureties in an 
amount to be fixed by the court, condi-
tioned upon the diligent prosecution of 
such action, and, in the event judgment 
in the said cause shall be against the 
plaintiff, for the payment to the 
defendant of all costs and expenses that 
may be awarded against such plaintiff, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee 
to be fixed by the court. In any such 
action, the prevailing party therein shall, 
in addition to an award of costs as 
otherwise provided, recover from the 
losing party therein such sum as counsel 
fees as shall be allowed by the court. 
The official bond of any such officer 
shall be liable for any such costs and 
attorneys fees. (Emphasis added). 
From the plain meaning of the underlined provisions above, it 
would appear that a bond need be posted only when a plaintiff 
4 
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sues police officers acting in the "course of the performance 
of" their duties as police officers, but not if he sues them 
in their private capacity when they have acted far beyond the 
normal range of legitimate police conduct. This interpretation 
is borne out by Utah case law. 
The facts in Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 
132 (1941) are similar to those in the instant case. In Wright 
the plaintiff brought a complaint against several police 
officers for personal injuries caused by the officers. The 
complaint evidenced a "studious attempt" to sue the officers as individual 
. 
and alleqed tJ13t t11ey had acted far beyond the range of their 
official duties. Furthermore, the suit in that case did not 
purport to be against the officers' bonds. The attorney for 
the defendants in the Wright case moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 
action since plaintiff had not posted a bond as required by 
Chapter 148, Laws of Utah, 1937, (predecessor to U.C.A. §78-11-10) 
which provided in part: 
In any action brought against any sheriff, 
constable, peace officer, state road 
officer, or any other person charged with 
the duty of enforcement of the criminal 
laws of this state, or service of civil 
process, when any such action arises out 
of, or in the course of, the performance 
of his duty, or in any action upon the bond 
of any such officer, the prevailing party 
therein shall, in addition to an award of 
costs as otherwise provided by law, recover 
from the losing party therein such sum as 
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the 
court. The official bond of any such officer 
shall be liable for any such costs and 
attorney fees. Before any such action is 
filed, and as a condition precedent thereto, 
the proposed plaintiff shall prepare and file 
with, and at the time of filing, the complaint 
5 
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in any such action, a written undertaking 
with at least two sufficient sureties in an 
amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned 
upon the diligent prosecution of such action 
and, in the event judgment in the said cause' 
shall be against the plaintiff, for the 
payment to the defendant of all costs and 
expenses that may be awarded against such 
plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee to be fixed by the court. Wright v. 
Lee, supra., at 135. 
The lower court in Wright granted defendants' Motion to Dismi5' 
but the Utah Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed the lower court 
and held that no bond was required of the plaintiff where the 
suit was brought against officers as indi victuals. In so rulin,, l, 
the Court distinguished the Wright facts fro~ those of an earlie:( 
case which had required a bond, Kiesel v. District Court, 96 
156, 84 P.2d 782 (1939). The Court noted: 
The instant case differs from the cited 
case, in that in the Kiesel case, the 
action was against the officers, as 
officers, and was also against the 
officers' bondsman. The instant case 
is an attempt to sue the defendants, not 
as officers, but as private individuals 
and the complaint evidences a studious 
attempt to limit this action to a private 
personal suit for which the bond of the 
officers would not be looked to for relief. 
Wright v. Lee, ~upra., at 134. 
The Supreme Court in Wright found that there was no evidence 
presented to support the Motion to Dismiss and so reversed it 
and remanded the case to the District Court. In Wright the 
I 
appellant had also raised the issue whether the statute requinn:[ 
the posting of a b6nd is constitutional. The Supreme Court I 
declined to rule on this issue, because no evidence was prcsentecl 
that would require the posting of a bond: 
The constitutionality of the statute 
cannot be passed on, upon this appeal 
6 
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as the action was instituted as a personal 
action and there is no evidence to invoke 
the application of the statute. Wright v. 
Lee, supra., at 135. 
The Wright case, after remand, went up to the 
Supreme Court of Utah a second time, Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah 90, 
138 P.2d 246 (1943) (hereinafter referred to as Wright II). The 
trial court, after remand in the first Wright case, had dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint a second time with a conclusory rationale 
that the defendants were police officers and that they 'were 
acting as such police officers and this action ... arose out of 
or in the course of the performance of the c4.ity ... as peace 
officers to enforce the criminal laws in the State of Utah'. 
See Wright II, at 246. The Utah Supreme Court once again reversed 
the trial court and ordered the cause to be reinstated. In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court states: 
We shall refer to the statute as it now 
appears in the Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
Sec. 104-44-22. The section reads: 
In any action brought against any sheriff, 
constable, peace officer, state road officer, 
or any other person charged with the duty of 
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state, 
or service of civil process, when any such 
action arises out of, or in the course of, 
the performance of his duty, or in any action 
upon the bond of any such officer, the pre-
vailing party therein shall, in addition to an 
award of costs as otherwise provided by law, 
recover from the losing party therein such sum 
as counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court. 
The official bond of any such officer shall be 
liable for any such costs and attorney fees. 
Had the section ended thus with the words 
"attorney fees", this case would not have 
arisen, nor would the case of Kiesel et. al. 
7 
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v. District Court, 96 Utah 156, 84 P.2d 
782. It is the last sentence of the section 
not quoted above, to wit: "Be fore any such ' 
action is filed" etc., that appears to have 
been construed as though the words, "when 
any such action arises out of, or in the 
course of, the performance of his duty", 
were not in the statute. It takes more than 
the fact of official position to make the last 
sentence of the section applicable. It must 
either be alleged in the complaint or shown 
by proof that the acts were official or so 
related thereto as to establish official immunit; 
The statute does not require the filing of 
a bond "in any action brought" against any 
person who happens to be a peace officer. 
The statute cannot be construed as a cloak 
to protect any peace officer by a bond as a 
condition precedent merely be~ause of his 
officical position and to prevent his being 
sued without the bond for personal wrongs having 
no relation to his official duties. Officers 
should be protected to the limit within the 
performance of their authorized acts and 
imposed duties. 
The language of the statute requires a 
bond only "when any such action arises out 
of, or in the course of, the performance 
of his duty". There is not a word in the 
complaint about any of the defendants being 
officers of any of the classes mentioned 
in the statute, nor is there any mention 
of any "bond" of such officer, nor that 
any of the wrongs against plaintiff were in 
any way related to any officer while in 
"the performance of his duty". 
The case of Kiesel et. al. v. District 
Court, supra., on certiorari to this court 
raised the question of jurisdiction of the 
trial court to proceed with the trial of 
an action against public officers after 
denying a motion to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to file a bond under Sec. 104-
44-22, supra. In the Kiesel case the suit 
upon which the certiorari proceeding was 
based was one against the city marshal of 
Salina, Utah, and his deputy and the surety 
upon their bonds. \~e held that the failur_EO 
1 
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to file a bond before or at the time of 
filing the complaint did not deprive the 
court of jurisdiction to proceed. That 
case differs from the instant case Irlthat 
the instant case does not purport to be a 
suit against public peace officers or upon 
their bonds. 
We are of the opinion the statute has not 
shut the door against the right to bring 
an action against any person, official or 
otherwise, for a wrong committed and not 
alleged to have any relation to or connec-
tion with official duties. It must therefore 
follow that the judgment of dismissal was 
erroneous. The cause should be reinstated. 
such is the order. Costs to appellant. 
(Emphasis added) 
In Wright II, Justice Wades' concurring opinion 
is especially helpful in its discussion as to the circumstances 
under which a plaintiff may be required to post a bond. Both 
the concurring and majority opinions recognize that the test is 
two-fold: ( 1) Were the defendants charged with the enforcement 
of the criminal laws? and (2) were the acts of the defendants 
committed in the course, or did they arise out of, the perfor-
mance of their duty in enforcement of the criminal laws? Justice 
Wade pointed out that if both questions were answered in the 
affirmative, the action was properly dismissed. However, the 
alleged facts had to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
and, on appeal, there must be substantial evidence to support 
the findings of the lower court. Justice Wade concluded: 
The defendants' evidence merely shows 
that they were police officers, and as 
such were instructed by their superior 
to make an investigation of the plaintiff, 
in connection with the writing of certain 
letters and with certain robberies, and that 
they made the arrest. They further testi-
fied that all the acts, alleged in the 
9 
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complaint, which they did, were done pur-
suant to and in furtherance of the instruc-
tions of their superior, and arose out of 
or were in the course of the performance ~f 
their duty as such officers. The testimony 
on the matters stated in the last sentence 
were the bald conclusions of the witnesses 
and no facts or circumstances in support ' 
thereof were given. In fact, the court ex-
pressly excluded such testimony. The mere 
fact that they were officers and were 
instructed to make an investigation of the 
plaintiff does not prove that the acts that 
they did were done in the course of the 
performance of their duty, nor does it prove 
that their acts arose out of the performance 
thereof. Nor is this shown by the conclusion 
to that effect. Such testimony may be 
admissable to show the purpose of the 
witnesses in committing the a,cts, still that 
question must be ultimately determined by~­
the court from all of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the commission 
of the acts in question. These facts not 
being disclosed, the evidence is insufficient 
to justify the decision. 
The court seemed to conclude that as 
long as the defendants were officers, and 
purporting to act as such, no matter how 
far they went beyond their duty, still 
plaintiff was required under the statute to 
furnish an undertaking. Apparently on 
this theory, all the evidence of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the acts 
complained of were excluded. The court 
stated that it was not interested in whether 
the defendants acted in good or bad faith, 
or with or without malice, or whether they 
acted reasonably. It intimated that it was 
immaterial even though they were merely 
"masquerading under the guise of police 
officers", and made the arrest knowing the 
plaintiff was guilty of no offense. If I 
have correctly interpreted the statute, it 
was necessary for the defendants to show 
either that they acted in the course of the 
performance of their duty as police officers, 
or if their acts did go beyond the course, 
still their acts must arise out of the per- .. , 
formance of such duty. Otherwise the plaintitc 
was not required to furnish an undcrtnkin0. 
] 0 
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.... 
In the instant case, the trial court's ruling, 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint solely because he did not post 
a bond pursuant to §78-11-10, was in error. The two Wright cases 
clearly show that the trial court is required to make a factual 
determination, which is not simply conclusory, as to whether 
the defendants acts were done in the course of performance of 
their duties. No bond is required prior to this factual deter-
mination and if defendants were acting outside their official 
capacity, no bond is required at all. It is the theory of 
plaintiff's complaint, that defendants' actions against him went 
. 
far beyond what is normally associated with the performance of 
defendants' duties. Plaintiff's complaint was carefully con-
structed so as to make clear that he was initiating a tort action 
against the defendants as individuals, and not as police 
officers, qua officers. Accordingly, plaintiff did not name 
Ogden City as a defendant nor does the caption of his complaint 
refer to the defendants in their capacity as police officers. 
Although the complaint, for purposes of clarity, does identify 
the defendants as law officers, it does not recite that they were 
acting within the performance of their duties as police officers. 
Rather, the complaint twice alleges that defendants' acts were 
far beyond the scope of normal police conduct. (Complaint, 1111 
7 & 10) 
The instant case, therefore, falls squarely 
within the holdings of the Wright cases and the trial court's 
decision dismissing plaintiff's suit should be reversed and the 
case reinstated. The only evidence presented by defendants at 
11 
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the hearing on their Motion to Dismiss were affidavits signed 
by the individual defendants declaring that they arrested 
plaintiff in the course of performance of duties with the Ogde: 
City Police Department and the arrest arose out of their duties 
i 
with the Department. This evidcence is conclusory in nature anc,; 
in accordance with the Wright cases, should not be dispositiw 
of the issues raised herein. 
POINT II. 
WHEN A PLAINTIFF PROCEEDS IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT OF 
IMPECUNIOSITY, THE TRIAL COURK', IN ITS 
DISCRETION, SHOULD WAIVE THE BOND SO 
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF PROVIDING 
IN FORMA PAUPERIS PROCEEDINGS IS NOT 
FRUSTRATED. 
Utah, like many other states, has established 
a procedure whereby impecunious litigants may appeal "any cause 
of action in any court in this state" without paying any of t~ , 
J , I "necessary fees and costs". Utah Code Annotated (1953) §21- ·i I 
et. ~- This section provides: 
Any person may institute, prosecute, 
defend and appeal any cause in any court 
in this state by taking and subscribing, 
before any officer authorized to admin-
ister an oath, the following: 
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the 
expenses of the action or legal proceedings 
which I am about to commence (or the appeal 
which I am about to take) , and that I verily 
believe I am justly entitled to the relief 
sought by such action, legal proceedings or 
appeal. 
The following section, U.C.A. §21-7-4, further provides: 
On such oath or affirmation being filed 
with any justice of the peace or clerk of 
any court, such justice of the peace or 
clerk, as the case may be, shall at once 
1 ') l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by th  Utah State Li rary. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
file any complaint or papers on appeal and 
do any and all things necessary or proper 
to be done as promptly as if such litigant 
had fully paid all the regular fees; and the 
constable or sheriff shall at once promptly 
serve any and all surrunonses, writs, process 
and subpoenas, and all papers necessary or 
proper in the prosecution or defense of such 
cause, for such poor person as if all the 
necessary fees and costs had be fully paid; 
provided, that in cases where an impeunious 
affidavit is filed the judge at the time of 
hearing the cause shall question the person 
who filed such affidavit as to his ability 
to pay and in the event that the judge is of 
the opinion that such person is reasonably 
able to pay the costs he shall direct that 
judgment or decree be not entered in favor 
of such person until such costs are paid. 
Such order may be later cance.led upon petition 
if the facts warrant such cancellation. 
(Emphasis added) 
As can been seen from the above statutes, if a person is deter-
mined to be impecunious, the court shall proceed "as if all the 
necessary fees and costs had been paid", 21-7-4. This latter 
wording is broad enough to include waiving a bond such as that 
required, when suing police officers, qua officers, by Utah Code 
Annotated §78-11-10 (cited supra.). The phrasing of §78-11-10 
also allows for this interpretation: 
... , the proposed plaintiff, as a condition 
precedent thereto, (i.e. filing the suit), 
shall prepare and file with, and at the time 
of filing the complaint in any such action, 
a written undertaking with at least two 
sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed 
by the court, ... (Emphasis added) 
13 
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The underlined language is broad enough to allow the trial 
court judge to waive the posting of a bond in the case of 
impecunious plaintiffs. This result would seem to be 
mandated by the statutory purposes of allowing impoverished 
plaintiffs to proceed in forma pauperis, i.e. to allow them 
their day in court for a full hearing of their claims. If 
an impecunious plaintiff cannot even afford the filing fees, 
how could the person afford the greater costs involved in 
posting a bond? To require an impecunious plaintiff to post i 
a bond would defeat the statutory intent ot Utah Code Annotateil 
I 
§21-7-3 et. seq. which allows an impecunious plaintiff to ' 
conduct a lawsuit "as if all the necessary fees and costs 
had been fully paid". It is a rule of statutory constuction 
that two statutes covering the same or similar subject matter 
should be construed so as to preserve the integrity of 
. 1' 
both. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of In Re Utah Savrnc;l 
and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P. 2d 929, 931 (19681 
stated the rule as follows: 
... It is true here, as it is in so many 
areas of the law, that one statute has 
been enacted at one time with a particular 
purpose in mind, and that another has been 
enacted at another time with a different 
purpose in mind. When this has been done 
and there is an apparent conflict, it is 
not proper to put all the emphasis to one 
statute, as though it stated all of the 
law on the subject to the exclusion of the 
other. They should be looked at together, 
in their relationship to each other, with a 
view to reconciling any such apparent 
conflict and giving each its intended 
effect insofar as that can be accomplished 
without nullifying the other. 1 
1. University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
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to be allowed to defeat another, if by 
reasonable construction the two can be 
made to stand together." To the same 
effect see also Western Beverage Co. of 
Provo, Utah v. Hansen et al., 98 Utah 
332, 96 P.2d llOS. -
Therefore, appellant respectfully urges that the 
court rule, as a matter of law, that where a plaintiff is 
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §21-7-3 et. ~· that the lower court ought to 
waive other costs, including the bond required by Utah Code 
Annotated §78-11-10 if the suit is against police officers, 
as officers acting within the legitimate scope of their duties, 
and against the officers' bonds. 
POINT III. 
TO REQUIRE A BOND UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED §78-11-10 IN ALL INSTANCES 
IS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AI1ENDi'1ENT TO THE UNITED STATE'S CONSTITUTION 
AND OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 11 
OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTION. 
The United States Su?reme Court in the case of 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, ( 1971) 
held that to require fees of impecunious plaintiff's in a 
divorce action and, consequently, to deny court access to those who were 
unable to pay a fee was a violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The court stated: 
American society, of course, bottoms 
its systematic definition of individual 
rights and duties, as well as its machinery 
for dispute settlement, not on custom or 
the will of strategically placed individuals, 
but on the common-law model. It is to 
courts, or other quasi-judicial official 
bodies, that we ultimately look for the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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implementation of a regularized, orderly 
process of dispute settlement. Within 
this framework, those who wrote our 
original Constitution, in the Fifth 
Amendment, and later those who drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment recognized 
the centrality of the concept of due 
process in the operation of this system. 
Without this guarantee that one may not 
be deprived of his rights, neither liberty 
nor property, without due process of law, 
the State's monopoly over techniques for 
binding conflict resolution could hardly 
be said to be acceptable under our scheme 
of things. Only by providing that the 
social enforcement mechanism must 
function strictly within these bounds can 
we hope to maintain an ordered society 
that is also just. It is upon. this premise 
that this Court has through years of adjudi-
cation put flesh upon the due process 
principle. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra. 
The Court continued: 
The arguments for this kind of fee and 
cost requirement are that the State's 
interest in the prevention of frivolous 
litigation is substantial, its use of court 
fees and process costs to allocate scarce 
resources is rational, and its balance be-
tween the defendant's right to notice and 
the plaintiff's right to access is reason-
able. 
In our opinion, none of these considerations 
is sufficient to override the interest of 
these plaintiff-appellants in having access 
to the only avenue open for dissolving their 
allegedly untenable marriages. Not only is 
there no necessary connection between a 
litigant's assets and the seriousness of his 
motives in bringing suit, but is is here 
beyond present dispute that appellants bring 
these actions in good faith. Moreover, other 
alternatives exist to fees and cost require-
ments as a means for conserving the time of 
courts and protecting parties from frivolous 
litigation, such as ?enalties for false 
pleadings or affidavits, and actions for 
malicious prosecution or abuse of process, 
to mention only a few. 
lG 
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In concluding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that these appellants be afforded 
an opportunity to go into court to obtain 
a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we 
go no further than necessary to dispose 
of the case before us, a case where the 
bonafides of both appellants' indigency 
and desire for divorce are here beyond 
dispute. We do not decide that access 
for all individuals to the courts is a 
right that is, in all curicumstances, guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise 
may not be placed beyond the reach of any 
individual, for, as we have already noted, 
in the case before us this right is the 
exclusive precondition to the adjustment 
of a fundamental human relationship. The 
requirement that these appelhants resort to 
the judicial process is entirely a state-
created matter. Thus we hold only that a 
State may not, consistent with the obligations 
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-exempt the 
right to dissolve this legal relationship 
without affording all citizens access to the 
means it has prescribed for doing so. 
In the instant case, if indeed the police officers 
assaulted and committed a battery upon the plaintiff and exceeded 
the legitimate scope of their authority and reasonableness, 
the plaintiff's only redress is by using the courts. The 
courts are the exclusive means for plaintiff's redress of in-
juries in this situation. To deny plaintiff access to the courts 
merely because he is unable to obtain the bond mentioned in 
U.C.A. §78-11-10 would be a violation of due process just as 
clearly as was the denial of access in the Boddie case. 
The Utah Constitution also supports plaintiff's 
argument for access to the courts unrestricted by his economic status. 
17 
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Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, ' 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
The mandated access is, for it speaks of "an injury done to 
him in his person, property, or reputation". The last clause 
is especially instructive: "no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal. in the State, ... 
any civil cause to which he is a party." To foreclose plaintif' ( 
from bringing his civil action for personal injuries done 
person would conflict with Section 11 of Article I, Utah 
to his r 
I 
! 
Constitution. Thus, it can be seen, that the right to a trial 
for redress for a personal injury is an inalienable right ®~t 
both the State and Federal Constitutions and should not be i 
denied a plaintiff merely because he is unable to pay for a bon·i 
as required by U.C.A. §78-11-10. This view is supported by the \ 
California case of Beaudreau v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 535 P.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1975) 
where the court struck down a similar bond requirement in I 
California before a plaintiff could sue a public employee. ~~1 
the court held that requiring a bond was a taking of property, I 
.) 
within the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitut10',' 
and that no bond could be required prior to the c'Ourt holding a 
1 0 1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a hearing as to the plaintiff's case. The court stated: 
The statutes before us make no provision 
for such a hearing. Every plaintiff who 
sues a public entity or public employee 
may be forced either to file an undertaking 
as security for the defendant's costs or to 
forego the prosecution of his claim. Absent 
proof of indigency, the court is given no 
discretion to dispense with the undertaking 
requirement if demanded by a qualifying 
defendant, regardless of the merit of the 
plaintiff's lawsuit. Furthermore, the 
legislation specifies no standards for 
determining the reasonable amount of such 
undertaking. If the defendant is satisfied 
to limit its demand to the statutory minimum, 
judicial aoproval is not required; if the 
defendant seeks a greater amQf.lnt, he must 
show "good cause". Yet the statutes do not 
purport to define "good cause" and do not 
provide that the plaintiff has a right to 
be heard on this matter. Thus any hearing 
which the plaintiff may receive on the issue 
of good cause necessarily "excludes consider-
ation of element[s] essential to the 
decision (Bell v. Burson, supra., 
402 U.S. at p. 542, 91 s. Ct. at p. 1591). 
It would not be a "meaningful" hearing, 
"appropriate to the nature or the case" and 
as such would not meet due process standards. 
(Armstrong v. Manzo, supra., 380 U.S. at p. 552, 
85 s. Ct. 1187; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., supra., 339, U.S. at p. 313, 70 
S. Ct. 652). Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 
supr<:...:_, at 720. 
It should be noted that the California case law had determined 
prior to this time that an indigent plaintiff should not be 
required to post any bond. Thus, the California law was more 
liberal than Utah's but still the statute was held to be 
unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is a poor person and he has filed an 
Affiuavit of Impecuniosity in order to pursue this action. If 
a person is determined to be impecunious the court shall proceed 
19 
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"as if all the necessary fees and costs had been paid", §27-H. 
This latter wording is broad enough to include waiving a bo~ 
such as that required, when suing police officers, ~ officers 
by Utah Code Annotated §78-11-10 . 
In the instant case, if indeed the police office:oi 
assaulted and conunitted a battery upon the plaintiff and exceede:'. 
the legitimate scope of their authority and reasonableness, the I 
plaintiff's only redress is by using the courts. The courts 
are the exclusive possibility for plaintiff's redress of injuriesl, 
I in this situation and to deny plaintiff access merely becau~~l 
. 
is unable to obtain the bond mentioned in U.C.A. §78-11-10 would! 
be a violation of due process. 
Furthermore, the two Wright cases clearly show 
I 
that the trial court is required to make a factual determinatio~,·1 
which is not simply conclusory, as to whether the defendants 
acted outside the scope of their official duties. No bond is 
required prior to this factual determination and if defend~U 1 
were acting outside their official capacity, no bond is required 
at all. 
DATED this ~day of November, 1980. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
-. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant 
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